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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOGNITION: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION DISCOURSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY IN
GERMANY AND THE U.S.A.

Kendall Thomas*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper undertakes a comparative exploration of affirmative action
discourse in German and American constitutional equality law. The first task for
such a project is to acknowledge an important threshold dilemma. The difficulty
in question derives not so much from dissimilarities between the technical legal
structures of German and American affirmative action policy. The problem stems
rather from the different social grounds and groupings on which those legal
structures have been erected. Because German "positive action"' applies only to
women, gender and its cultural meanings have constituted the paradigmatic
subject of the policy. The legal discussion of positive action has always taken its
point of reference from broader political debates about the position of women as
a social group in contemporary German society. Indeed, in Germany, positive
action discourse is a discourse about the status of and relations between men and
women.
Like German positive action policy, U.S. affirmative law has from its
inception included women among its beneficiaries. However, the background
social vision and cultural meanings that have informed American affirmative
action discourse could not be more different. Although affirmative action policy
in the U.S. has always applied to women, questions of gender and gender
equality have been marginal to the legal discourse that has grown up around the
subject. For example, in the twenty years since the first of its many forays into
the field, the U.S. Supreme Court has only once squarely considered the legality
of gender-based affirmative action programs.2 Even then, the Court did not
explicitly address the constitutional dimensions of gender-based affirmative
* Professor, Columbia University Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the generosity
of the Berlin Prize Fellowship of the American Academy in Berlin in supporting the research for this
article, and of the Robert Bosch Stiftung in funding the symposium at which this article was
presented.
In Germany, as in Europe more generally, "positive action" is the preferred designation for
policies that in the U.S. are labeled affirmative action. For an exploration of the conceptual meaning
of "positive action" and related terms, see Teresa Rees, Mainstreaming Equality in the European
Union 26-48 (1998).
2 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 480 U.S. 616, 107 S.Ct. 1442
(1987).
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action, but confined its discussion to the legitimacy of such programs under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The relative silence regarding gender-based affirmative action that one finds in
U.S. case law can also be seen in the broader political debates of which the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence is a part. In the United States, the discussion of
affirmative action has revolved almost exclusively around race; conversely, the
national conversation about racial equality has increasingly (and rather
reductively) focused on affirmative action. To the extent that gender has figured
at all in U.S. affirmative action discourse, it has for the most part been trapped
in, or refracted through, the interstices of race.3 The peculiar and persistent
prominence of race in American law and politics thus forces a comparative
critical analysis of affirmative action discourse in the U.S. and Germany to
follow a strategy of inference and indirection.
Accordingly, unlike the discussion of German law which follows it, the
account of U.S. affirmative action policy developed here proceeds primarily
through an analysis of Supreme Court case law on the constitutionality of racebased affirmative action. After a brief overview of the legal and political context
in which U.S. affirmative action was born, I examine the vicissitudes of
affirmative action policy in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court. Although the relevant decisions have had little or nothing to say about
gender as such, a reading of the cases suggests that gender-based affirmative
action and contemporary equality doctrine are moving rapidly toward a
constitutional collision. The crucial question is whether gender-conscious
affirmative action programs will be able to withstand the impact that has so
debilitated its race-based counterpart.
My survey of the American constitutional landscape clears the ground for the
comparative observations offered in the paper's final section. There I compare
and contrast the U.S. judicial discourse on affirmative action with two recent
3 An instructive instance can be found in the political skirmishes over Initiative 200, a measure to
forbid affirmative action programs in Washington state. In the weeks leading up to the vote,
opponents of the proposed initiative organized a campaign focused on the effects it would have on
employment and declare educational opportunities for women in the state. The strategy was no doubt
motivated in part by survey evidence which showed an II percent increase in over-all support for
affirmative action among respondents who were queried about gender-based, as opposed to racebased versions of the policy. Supporters of the Washington initiative were soon forced to openly play
the race card. John Carlson, a talk show host and leader of the initiative campaign, complained that
opponents of the measure "are trying to make this a gender issue, rather than an issue of racial
preferences, which is most of what is encompassed by [Proposition] 200." Michelle Ackerman, a
spokeswoman for the No!200 campaign, responded that "affirmative action is primarily a gender
issue in this state. It is a woman's issue. The primary beneficiaries of affirmative action in this state
are white women. So that is what we should be discussing." The public relations strategy devised by
the opponents of Initiative 200 was ultimately unsuccessful. The measure won the approval of a
majority of Washington voters in November, 1998. Sam Howe Verhovek, In a Battle Over
Preferences, Race and Gender are at Odds, N.Y Times, October 20, 1998, at Al. For press accounts
of the referenced survey evidence, see L.A. Times, March 30, 1995, at Al; Atlanta Constitution,
August 6, 1995, at lB (Cited in Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in
Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity and Group Rights 112, 147, at note 33 (1997)).
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judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 4 Although it
draws on a common conceptual lexicon, from an American perspective, the
positive action jurisprudence of the ECJ seems to charting a very different
course than the U.S. Supreme Court. This divergence, I argue, cannot be fully
explained by the fact that the European Union (EU)5 positive action cases have
focused exclusively on issues of gender equality. I suggest that the unique
political dynamics of the European Union have prodded the ECJ closer toward a
more substantive conception of constitutional equality. As we shall see, this
structural understanding has (for the most part) been resisted in American law.
However, given its still tentative character, one may well wonder whether the
ECJ will embrace this substantive approach outside the context of gender. Using
the current German debates about race, ethnicity and citizenship as an example,
the paper ends with a few remarks on the challenges that EU positive action
discourse will likely face in the coming years.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL "PRE-HISTORY" OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN THE U.S.

The starting point for any critical account of American affirmative action
jurisprudence is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. 6 As Gerald Neuman notes in his contribution to this
Symposium, the animating purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to
address the myriad discriminations to which Southern state and local
governments subjected their African-American citizens. However, the generality
of the language in which the provision was framed quickly led to disputes about
its meaning and application. These disputes inevitably made their way to the
U.S. Supreme Court. In the decades following its adoption, the Supreme Court
increasingly limited the scope of the Equal Protection Clause in a series of
doctrinal deformations that culminated in the now infamous decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson.7 Deploying an ambiguous "reasonableness" standard, the Court
upheld a Louisiana statute requiring railroad companies to provide "equal but
separate accommodations for the white and colored races." The Plessy Court
rejected the argument that state mandated racial segregation on passenger
railway trains violated the Equal Protection Clause. In the Court's view, that
argument stemmed from two errors. The first alleged error was a failure to
distinguish between "civil," "legal" or "political" equality, which were
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, and "social" equality, which was
not. The second was the notion, deemed "fallacious" by the Court, that "the
I For the sake of concision, I henceforth refer to this institution as the "Court of Justice" or the
"ECJ".
I The Treaty on European Union [TEU] of 1991 renamed the "European Economic Community"
the "European Union." Although some of the materials to which I refer pre-date the 1991 change,
for the sake of consistency, I shall use the more recent designation throughout this discussion.
6 The Equal Protection Clause reads, in pertinent part: "No state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
7 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority." 8 For the Plessy Court, so long as it was not "unreasonable" and
applied equally as a formal matter across the color line, state compelled racial
discrimination with respect to "social" matters could not be said to contravene
the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause drew a stinging
rebuke from the sole dissenting justice in Plessy. Justice John Marshall Harlan
rejected the notion that the Louisiana law's equal applicability to "white and
colored citizens" in any way satisfied the requirements of equal protection. For
Harlan, the challenged law could not be divorced from its social context. The
Plessy majority had ignored an incontrovertible social fact: "Every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons." Although he
agreed that the "white race" could rightly consider itself "to be the dominant
race in this country," Harlan denied that this social dominance could be read
into the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[I]n view of the constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of
citizens."' 0 Harlan insisted that "[olur constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Under the American constitutional
order, "all citizens are equal before the law. [ ...
I The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.""
The Plessy decision marked the Court's ratification of a national retreat from
policies associated with the post-Civil War Reconstruction that had begun
several years before. The decision served as a crucial cornerstone around which
state and local governments (not only in the South) constructed a comprehensive
system of legalized racial segregation. In the years after Plessy, the reach of
racial apartheid would extend into almost every area of American life.
The most important doctrinal dimension of Plessy lies its limitation of the
equality principle to a rule of formally symmetrical treatment. The most
important political dimension of the decision was the Court's apparent
acquiescence in the fact that its acontextual, formalist interpretation of the equal
protection principle would permit (if not encourage) the use of law to maintain
the radically unequal material conditions to which Black Americans in the South
and elsewhere had historically been consigned. For decades to come, the racial
state to which the Plessy Court had given judicial legitimacy would remain all
but impervious to constitutional attack under the Equal Protection Clause.
The first cracks in the doctrinal edifice the Court had erected in Plessy
appeared in the late 1930's. In a series of cases challenging the constitutionality
of racial segregation in public education, the Court put increasing pressure on
I Id., at 551.
9 Id., at 557.

10 Id., at 559.
" Id.. at 559.
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the "separate but equal" approach for which Plessy had come to stand. The
most famous of these cases was the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. 12 In Brown, the Supreme Court held that state mandated
segregation was "inherently unequal" in the field of public school education and
thus forbidden under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Brown opinion has come to be read as an emphatic rejection of Plessy.
That claim, however, requires considerable qualification. As an initial matter, the
Brown Court remained curiously silent about the precise standard of
constitutional review under which race-specific laws and policies were to be
evaluated. In its 1944 decision in the Korematsu case, the Court had held that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect."' 3 However, formally speaking, the legal regime of racially
segregated public school education at issue in Brown was quite different from
the exclusion orders challenged in Korematsu. By its terms, the "separate but
equal" policy that the Court struck down in Brown affected all racial groups; the
exclusion orders upheld in Korematsu were much narrower in their reach. Since
the Brown opinion declined to say whether the Court was adopting the "suspect
classification" theory announced in Korematsu, it remained unclear whether the
rule of "reasonableness" deployed in Plessy was still the controlling standard of
constitutional review in racial equality law. Further, Brown betrayed a stunning
lack of clarity regarding the precise normative theory of the Equal Protection
Clause that underwrote the opinion. Although Brown could and would come to
be construed as an endorsement of the "color blindness" principle of Harlan's
dissent in Plessy, the actual language of the opinion was much more ambiguous.
In the era of affirmative action, the Brown Court's silence regarding these two
aspects of Plessy would make its pronouncements on the meaning of
constitutional equality an object of heated dispute.
Moreover, a number of contemporary commentators have noted just how
much of the underlying formalism of the Plessy decision the Brown Court left
undisturbed.' 4 At the doctrinal level, Brown left little doubt that the "separate
but equal" principle had sustained a mortal blow. At a deeper conceptual level,
however, Brown in no way challenged the notion that the guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment was essentially a guarantee of formal legal equality.
Nothing in Brown provided a constitutional basis for attacking the many and
massive material disparities between public schools in white and black
neighborhoods which could not be directly attributed to race-based
12Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the companion case of
Boiling v. Sharpe, handed down the same day as Brown, the Court invalidated the federal
government's maintenance of racially segregated schools in the District of Columbia. Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
impose limits on the federal government that were substantially the same as those to which the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bound the several states.
13Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
14 Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness, History and the Law, in The House That Race
Built 280, 283-284 (Wahneema Lubiano, ed., 1997); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
Harvard L. Rev. 1710 (1993).
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discrimination in education law, even where these structural inequalities could be
linked to "racial effects" in areas such as housing, employment, tax, or labor
law: the continuing subordinate social and economic status of African-Americans
remained beyond the scope of the Equal Protection Clause. While Brown may
have limited the logic of Plessy, it refused to reject Plessy's restriction of the
Equal Protection Clause to a guarantee of formal equality. The chief conceptual
distinction between the two decisions lies in their differing views regarding the
constitutional legitimacy of racial categorization. Where Plessy upheld racial
classifications so long as they were equally applied on both sides of the color
line, Brown found such classifications invalid even if their formal impact was
the same across the racial divide. Put another way, the Plessy Court read the
Fourteenth Amendment to permit color-consciousness; the Brown Court appeared
to read the Equal Protection Clause to require color-blindness. The crucial point
to be noted here is that both decisions construe the concept of equality in
simple, rather than more complex terms. In Plessy and Brown, the target of the
Fourteenth Amendment was understood to be the formal use of racial
classifications, not the subordinate material situation of an identifiable racial
group or class.
I.

THE POLITICAL GENEALOGY OF AMERICAN AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LAW

Within a few short decades, the rule of racial non-recognition announced in
Brown would become the chief battleground in a fierce ideological war over the
meanings of constitutional equality, especially with respect to affirmative action.
The origins and early evolution of affirmative action policy in the U.S. are
myriad and complex. A detailed chronicle of affirmative action is beyond the
scope of this paper. 5 For our purposes, it is enough to note the key historical
episodes in the policy's elaboration during the 1960's and 1970's, which
emerged in response to the ongoing campaign by black Americans and their
allies to force the national government to move more quickly along the road of
racial progress.
At the national level, the inaugural moment in this history was the 1961
Executive Order signed by President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy's order created
the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), a
largely ineffective body whose special mandate was to supervise government
contractors in order to ensure that they did not discriminate on the basis of race.
The Kennedy Order empowered the PCEEO to take "affirmative action" to
prevent the use of race, creed, color, or national origin from entering into the
hiring process. Although this language was at base no more than a synonym for
color blindness, the important point to be noted here was that it marked the
entrance of affirmative action into the lexicon of civil rights discourse.
I5

For an excellent history of race-based affirmative action policy see John David Skrentny, The

Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and Justice in America (1996).
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A second key moment in the early history of affirmative action is President
Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 Executive Order, which established the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC). Like Kennedy's order, the Johnson Order
required that "affirmative action" be taken to promote equal racial opportunities
in the field of government contracting. In a series of "special area plans" that
were designed to enforce compliance with construction contracts, the OFCC
required firms to actively recruit, hire and train applicants from racial minorities.
During the Johnson presidency, the notion of affirmative action would gradually
evolve into a race-conscious, numbers-oriented policy approach.
Even more important than his Executive Order, however, was Johnson's role
in orchestrating the passage by Congress of federal legislation opening up labor
markets, public accommodations, and voting rights to racial minorities. The
centerpiece of this unprecedented legislation was Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which forbade employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 16 To ensure compliance with Title VII, Congress created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which would become the
most powerful enforcement agency in the field of civil rights law. Although its
enabling legislation specifically prohibited "preferential treatment to any
individual or group," in time the EEOC would become frustrated with the
limitations of the color-blindness model on which Title VII was based. Those
frustrations eventually came to be shared by the federal judiciary. At the EEOC's
urging, federal courts gradually began to expand the reach of Title VII by using
judicial power not merely to guarantee formal equality of opportunity, but to
achieve objective material results. The shift toward this explicitly race-conscious
interpretation of Title VII stemmed not so much from a philosophical aversion to
the ideal of color blindness as from a pragmatic realization that the language of
the legislation still made it possible for employers to engage in racially
discriminatory practices that plaintiffs would find it difficult to prove.
Affirmative action thus came to be seen as the only realistic response to the
inadequacies of the color blindness approach. As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in one case, "[w]e believe that [race-conscious] numerical
objectives may be the only feasible mechanism for defining with any clarity the
obligation of ... [employers] to move employment practices in the direction of
true neutrality."' 7 Although neither the EEOC nor the courts had developed
anything resembling a coherent theory of the relationship between race-specific
affirmative action and the equality principle, the gradual consolidation of a
pragmatic consensus regarding the limits of color-blindness represented an
important step in the interpretation of Title VII, and in the early history of
affirmative action policy.
16 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section
2003 et seq. Interestingly, the Civil Rights Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' power, under the
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, to regulate commerce among the several states. U.S.
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"1 Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2nd 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1972).
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The third and most decisive moment in the formulation of contemporary
affirmative action policy was made by President Richard M. Nixon. As one
commentator has noted, Nixon "did more than any other president to promote
and institutionalize affirmative action."'" It is now generally agreed that Nixon's
support of affirmative action stemmed from mixed motives-he saw affirmative
action as a wedge with which to drive white Southern and working class
Democrats into the arms of the Republican Party. 9 Nonetheless, the fact that
race-based affirmative action received its most progressive and explicit
formulation by a Republican President did much to secure its ideological
legitimacy as a tool for achieving racial equality.
IV. RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT
By the time the Supreme Court first squarely addressed affirmative action's
constitutional dimensions in 1978, it had been adopted in various forms at both
the national and state levels. Affirmative action law and policy very quickly
grew beyond an initial focus on employment practices and public work contracts
to include a number of other areas. Indeed, the Court's first full consideration of
affirmative action involved the use of the policy in public university admissions.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 20 the Court heard an appeal
in a case challenging a program aimed at increasing the enrollment of minority
students at the University of California Davis medical school. Under the
program, sixteen of the school's seats were reserved each year for members of
racial minority groups who were deemed to have suffered economic or
educational deprivation. Alan Bakke, a white applicant who had been denied
admission to the medical school, filed suit challenging the legality of the Davis
admissions policy on constitutional and statutory grounds.
As one study of the subject has noted, the Bakke decision provides an
exemplary instance of the "divisiveness and fragmentation"'" that has marked
the Supreme Court's interventions in affirmative action policy. In the years since
Brown, the Supreme Court's racial equality jurisprudence had become a
complexly plaited strand of divergent precedents. By the time it took up the
issue raised in Bakke, the Court's decisions could be read to support at least
three different and conflicting interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause. The
first interpreted the Constitution to embody a categorical requirement of color
blindness. The second took the view that race-conscious classifications may be
justified only upon a showing that they will advance compelling government
18 Troy Duster, Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California Strategy, 55
Representations 41 (1996) (emphasis in original).
'9 See id.; Skrentny, supra note 15; Kenneth O'Reilly, Nixon's Piano: Presidents and Racial
Politics from Washington to Clinton (1995); H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the
Nixon White House (1994); John D. Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (1982).
20 See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21 See Michel Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action and Justice: A Philosophical and Constitutional
Inquiry 168 (1991).
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interests, such as the granting of relief to specific victims of demonstrated racial
discrimination. The third position held that the Equal Protection Clause does not
forbid the use of racial categories which aim to eliminate the continuing current
effects of past discrimination.22 In the words of one commentator, "the first
position would seem to bar all racial preferences; the second, to confine them to
purely compensatory situations; while the third one would seem to sanction a
much broader use of preferential treatment at least in part justified by
distributive concerns." 23 In practice, each of these views has entailed radically
competing constructions of the constitutional text and rival standards of
constitutional review. More fundamentally, each embodies deeply antagonistic
understandings of the equality principle itself.
In Bakke, four members of of the Court thought that the UC Davis program
violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and would therefore have avoided
the question of its constitutionality, since the case could be disposed of on
narrower statutory grounds. This group of justices was outvoted by the other
five members of the Court, who took the view that affirmative action is
constitutional in certain circumstances.
However, the Bakke majority could not agree on what those circumstances
were, or on the appropriate standard of review by which their constitutionality
might be assessed. Four of the Justices who voted to uphold the UC affirmative
action program would have applied an "intermediate" level of scrutiny to the
Davis admission policy.24 Significantly, this standard had found its first and
fullest expression in the Court's gender discrimination jurisprudence.25 As its
name suggests, "intermediate scrutiny" may be situated somewhere between the
deferential "rational basis" standard applied in challenges to "ordinary"
(typically economic) legislation and the more exacting "strict scrutiny" test that
the Court had by then deemed appropriate for race-specific statutes which
disadvantage racial minorities. As Justice Brennan wrote in justifying his choice
of evaluative standard:
[Because] of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly
benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by
invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any
conceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justify such a
classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. In
addition, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or that singles out
those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign
26
program.

Brennan argued that, in this instance, the use of racial classifications to remedy
prior discrimination satisfied the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. On
22 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 Harvard L. Rev. 1189, 1273 (1987).
23 Rosenfeld, supra note 21, at 143.
24 24 Bakke, 438 U.S., at 359; but see id., at 361-62 (suggesting strict scrutiny is proper review
standard).
25 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
26 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361.
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Brennan's account, the Davis medical school's consideration of the race of
student applicants was directed toward a "benign" purpose of removing "the
disparate racial impact. .. [produced by] past discrimination." 27 Brennan further
noted that no evidence had been adduced that the Davis admissions program
stigmatized any group or individual. Accordingly, Justice Brennan and the three
of his colleagues who joined his opinion found no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The third and controlling vote in Bakke was that of Justice Louis Powell, who
announced the judgment of the Court. Unlike the other members of the Bakke
majority, Justice Powell took the position that all racial classificationsincluding those employed to benefit racial minorities-were suspect and thus
subject to a uniform standard of heightened or "strict" scrutiny. "Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination." 2 8 Powell conceded that the University of
California had a "legitimate and substantial" interest in addressing the present
effects of prior discrimination. Nevertheless, he maintained that the Davis
program was constitutionally flawed, since it had not been based on any judicial,
administrative or legislative findings of prior discrimination. For Justice Powell,
although the medical school's interest in securing a diverse student body
warranted some consideration of race in the admissions process, that interest
could not justify the split system under which white applicants were denied a
chance to compete for certain seats. Accordingly, Justice Powell agreed with the
four of his colleagues who believed that the existing admissions plan was illegal.
Unlike those justices, however, Powell squarely based this conclusion not on
statutory, but on Fourteenth Amendment constitutional grounds. On the other
hand, Powell joined with Justice Brennan and his colleagues in refusing to
enjoin categorically all use of racial classifications. Powell proposed an
alternative to the Davis program that would permit a university to view an
applicant's race as a "plus," so long as the consideration of race did not
effectively "insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for
29
the available seats."
Beneath the doctrinal disagreements in Bakke lay a more fundamental dispute
about the socio-cultural meanings of constitutional equality. The divergent
understandings the Court brought to the case found their most revealing
expression in the conceptual foundations on which the Justices staked out their
positions on the relevant doctrinal issues. In the course of explaining their
positions, each of the Justices who wrote in Bakke thought it necessary to offer
the nation a brief seminar on the racial history of the United States. The lessons
they drew from that past, however, differed markedly in accent and emphasis.
Consider in this connection the historical accounts that structure the opinions
of Justices Powell and Brennan. Justice Powell conceded that, as an historical
matter, the "one pervading purpose" behind the Fourteenth Amendment was
21
28
29

Id., at 369.
Id., at 291.
Id., at 317.
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"the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from those
who had formerly exercised dominion over him." 30 Nonetheless, the fact that the
Framers of the Equal Protection Clause "conceived of its primary function as
bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white
'majority' "' was, for Powell, far from dispositive in the case at hand. To
secure this claim, Powell recurs once more to history. On Powell's historical
account:
During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had become
a Nation of minorities. Each had to struggle-and to some extent struggles still-to
overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a 'majority' composed
of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps unfairly in many casesthat a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups. As the
Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually
32
extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination.
As a rhetorical matter, Powell's conflation of the very different and divergent
histories of "racial" and "national" difference in the United States is crucially
linked to the doctrinal framework that leads him to reject the UC Davis program
on constitutional grounds. For Justice Powell, the entrenched subordination of
African slaves and their descendants is essentially no different from the
"prejudices" directed at other "minority groups." In this reading of the history
of disadvantage in the United States, the very "concepts of 'majority' and
33
'minority' necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments.
To be sure, Justice Powell does concede (in a footnote) that "[n]o one denies
the regrettable fact that there has been societal discrimination in this country
against various racial and ethnic groups."' 34 In Powell's view, however, this
history of "societal discrimination" does not justify "the artificial line of a
'two-class' theory" 3 that would draw a doctrinal distinction between "benign"
and "invidious" racial classifications. Powell also rejected the notion that this
"two-class theory" (so-called) could legitimately be deployed to "evaluate the
extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority
groups'' 36 in order to determine "which groups ...merit 'heightened judicial
solicitude' and which [do] not."' 37 If the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
is not to be hitched to "the ebb and flow of political forces," ' 38 the standard of
judicial review in the Court's racial equality jurisprudence must "remain
constant." 3 9 Moreover, "justice" 4 for "innocent persons"' 4' such as Allan Bakke
30

Id., at 291 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873)).

31 Id.,
32

at 293.
Id., at 292.

33Id., at 295.

Id., at 296 n. 36.
35Id., at 295.
36

Id., at 296.

37Id., at 296-297.
38

Id., at 298.

39Id., at 299.
4

Id., at 298.
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demands a similar constancy in the interpretation of the equality principle itself.
As Justice Powell put it, "[tihe guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is
not equal."

' 42

In explaining his approach to the case, Justice Brennan offered a markedly
different account of the relevant history, and its constitutional implications.
Brennan prefaced his discussion of the issues with the reminder that although
[o]ur Nation was founded on the principle that 'all men are created equal[,]' ....
candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution . . .openly

compromised this principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery. The consequences
of this compromise are well known and have aptly been called our 'American
Dilemma' .... [I]t
is well to recount how recent the time has been, if it has yet

come, when the promise of our principles has 43flowered into the actuality of equal
opportunity for all regardless of race and color.
Justice Brennan then connected that historical background with the doctrinal
question before the Court:
Claims that law must be 'color-blind' or that the datum of race is no longer relevant
to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. This
is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too often been used
by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot-and ...
need not . . .let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many

'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and
by their fellow citizens.44

45
Because "officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing of the past,"
argued Brennan, the Court did not distort the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause in permitting race-conscious policies whose purpose was "not to demean
or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice .. .."46 For Brennan, this interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment fully comported with the Court's own precedents. The notion,
"summed up by the shorthand phrase '[ojur Constitution is color-blind,' " that
race is always and everywhere constitutionally irrelevant, insisted Brennan, "has
never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause."' 47 The crucial question was whether the Fourteenth Amendment required
all race-based classifications to be assessed under the same strict standard.
Brennan thought not, particularly when, as in Bakke, the constitutional challenge
to the use of racial categories had been brought by a member of a group that
lacked any of the "traditional indicia of suspectness" that would warrant
heightened scrutiny. As a social group, white Americans are not "saddled with

41Id.,
42 Id.,
43Id.,
" Id.,
41Id.,
46Id.,
41Id.,

at 298.
at 289-290.
at
at
at
at
at

327.
327.
327.
325.
355.
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such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of powerful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."'4 Accordingly,
the more permissive standard of intermediate scrutiny could be appropriately
applied to the Davis admissions program.
By failing to produce a majority opinion in Bakke, the Court further clouded
an already opaque doctrinal landscape. Despite their rhetorical exertions, neither
flank of the Court fully came to grips with the fundamental problem presented
in Bakke. That problem is the root tension between affirmative action in any
form, on one hand, and the idea of "anti-discrimination," on the other. By the
time the Court took up Bakke, the normative postulate of anti-discrimination had
arguably become the mediating principle in judicial interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 49 Indeed, it would not be too much to say that the Court's
jurisprudence could be read as asserting something like a conceptual connection
between equality and anti-discrimination.50 Over time, the sheer taken-forgrantedness of the contingent, but firmly entrenched connection between these
two ideas has become a kind of "common sense" in the Court's approach to
race-based affirmative action.
What is the source of the Court's increasingly fierce attachment to the antidiscrimination principle? The animating injunction that informs the antidiscrimination model of equal protection is the notion that "likes must be treated
alike." This axiom of equal treatment carries a certain aesthetic attraction and a
basic notional simplicity. As a number of commentators have noted, the
antidiscrimination norm is both easily formalized and formally realized. After
all, as we have seen, the formal conception of equality has a long pedigree in
racial equality law. In my view, however, the aesthetic and intellectual
enchantments of formalism offer at best a partial account for Court's growing
impatience with race-based affirmative action. Whatever its local validity, the
formalist account cannot explain why the idea of race-consciousness has
increasingly provoked an hostility of a deeper, more ideological kind.
To see why this is so, we may complete this part of our discussion by turning
to some of the Court's more recent affirmative action jurisprudence. Since
Bakke, the Supreme Court has addressed the legitimacy of affirmative action in
over a dozen decisions. The crucial turning point in this area of racial equality
jurisprudence was the Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.5
Croson involved a challenge to a program in Richmond, Virginia that required
prime contractors on city public works contracts to subcontract at least thirty
percent of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more "Minority Business
Enterprises." The Supreme Court held that the city ordinance under which the
program had been adopted violated the Equal Protection Clause. For the first
48

Id., at 357.

41 See Rosenfeld, supra note 21; Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. Phil. &

Pub. Aff. 107 (1976).
50 Consider, for example, the extent to which the term "anti-discrimination law" has now become
synonymous with "equal protection law."
51 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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time, the Court settled on a unitary standard-the "strict scrutiny" principlefor assessing the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action.
In defending the constitutionality of its public works contracts policies, the
Richmond city government had offered evidence that minority-owned businesses
in the city had received virtually no city construction contracts, that they rarely
held memberships in the network of trade associations through which city
contracts were informally brokered, and that the local construction industry had
practiced persistent and pervasive discrimination against blacks and other racial
minorities. Moreover, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent from the Court's
judgment, the challenged ordinance had been adopted by a city that was the
"former capital of the [Southern] Confederacy," 52 whose "disgraceful history of
public and private racial discrimination" had been "richly documented" 3 in
litigation challenging invidious racial discrimination in housing, public
education, and electoral politics.
At one level, Croson marked the triumph of the formal method in the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. In her opinion for the Croson majority, Justice
O'Connor did not deny the "sorry history of both private and public
discrimination"m in the United States. She nonetheless declared that Richmond's
attempt to confront the consequences of that historical legacy for its own
construction industry was foreclosed by Equal Protection Clause. On the Court's
account, the practices whose effects the city had sought to address could not be
traced to any "direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in
letting contracts, or [to] any evidence that the city's prime contractors had
discriminated against minority owned sub-contractors." 55 Rather, the Richmond
plan was a policy response to a more generalized species of "[s]ocietal
discrimination" 5 6 in the national construction industry as a whole. The very
magnitude of these discriminatory practices rendered them too "amorphous a
basis" 57 for a race-specific affirmative action plan such as the Richmond
ordinance. For the Croson majority, the national dimensions of racial

discrimination in the American construction industry did not permit affirmative
action by local governments to address the structural effects of that
discrimination in their own backyards. According to Justice O'Connor, only
Congress was technically empowered under the Fourteenth Amendment to
address the effects of past and continuing "societal" discrimination.5" In a
curious twist of judicial logic, the sword that allows the U.S. Congress to
address the national consequences of racial wrongs became a constitutional
shield against similar legislative action on the part of the state and municipal
governments that were closest to the problem.
52 Id., at 528.
53 Id., at 529.

Id., at 499.
Id., at 480.
56 Id., at 497 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)).
57 Id., at 497 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)).
58 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the U.S. Congress "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 5.
54
55
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As a constitutional matter, this distinction between particularized "individual"
discrimination and more generalized "societal" discrimination is not required
either by the text or the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment. What, then, is
the basis of the Croson Court's obdurate refusal to consider "societal" and
"individual" discrimination in the same constitutional light? I have argued that,
standing alone, the aesthetic and intellectual allure of formalism provides an
indequate account of Court's adherence to the anti-discrimination model of
constitutional equality. Much the same may be said of the federalism-based
justification the Court offers for the divergent treatment of "societal" and
"individual" discrimination. To my mind, the Croson opinion's stated fealty to
the principles of federalism only partially explains its different approaches to
these two forms of discrimination.59 The decision to invalidate the Richmond
program has more to do with the political ideology of abstract individualism
than it does with the political forms of federal and state governmental power.6°
How is this claim to be understood? Recall that in Bakke, Justice Powell
introduces a theme that is sounded in all the Court's subsequent affirmative
action decisions. A proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Powell
asserts, must begin with a recognition that the equal protection to which that text
refers is a matter of individual rights:
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons .... It is settled

beyond question that the 'rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, 61by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are

personal rights.'

As we have seen, however, Justice Powell was eventually forced to concede
what he so deeply wanted to deny-that equal protection analysis cannot avoid
62
reference to the realities of group life in American society.
The ideological rhetoric of abstract individualism is accorded a similar
prominence in the Croson decision. For example, at one point in the Court's
opinion, Justice O'Connor argues that perhaps the chief defect in the challenged
Richmond plan is the degree to which it denies "certain citizens" the
opportunity to compete for a reserved percentage of public contracts solely
based on their race: "To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their
'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a
59Indeed, some six years later, Justice O'Connor would effectively deny that Congress had any
more authority to address "society-wide [racial] discrimination" than state or local governments. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
o See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
49-50 (1976). For a brief intellectual history of the idea, see Steven Lukes, Individualism 73-78
(1973). A concise account of the "abstract individual model" is offered in John Skrentny, supra note
15 at 26-28. In what follows, I deploy an analytic distinction between the "formal" and the
"abstract individual" model of equality. However, like the cultural common sense on which it draws,
the Court's equality jurisprudence in fact often combines (and even collapses) these distinctions.
Nonetheless, for heuristic purposes, the differentiation of the two models is analytically useful, so
long as one remains mindful that they are rarely so cleanly separable in affirmative action discourse.
61 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)) (emphasis
supplied).
62 See discussion supra at 10-11.
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rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision
making." ' 63 Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw has rightly criticized Justice
O'Connor's reductive dismissal of race as a meaningful constitutional fact. The
Croson Court "decided that race would be narrowly construed to basically
represent simply skin color-devoid of any historical, political, or economic
value." ' 64 O'Connor then throws this "deracinated" notion of race in the
chromatic dustbin. Like hair or eye color, skin color becomes an incidental
aspect of the "real" subject of constitutional rights: the abstract, anonymous
individual. And yet, like Justice Powell's Bakke, the Croson opinion is finally
unable to sustain the normative claim that race is an empty, inconsequential
category in constitutional analysis. When Justice O'Connor sets out to explain
why the city's reliance on evidence of statistical disparities in the construction
industry is constitutionally irrelevant, she does so in social terms that betray her
individualistic ethos. "There are," she writes, "numerous explanations for [the]
dearth of minority participation in Richmond's construction sector], including
past discrimination as well as both black and white career and entrepreneurial
choices." ' 65 Indeed, O'Connor speculates "[b]lacks may be disproportionately
attracted to industries other than construction." 66 Note the discursive strategy in
play here. In a move that is precisely the antithesis of the individualism to
which she purports to be committed, Justice O'Connor attributes the absence of
"certain citizens" in the construction industry to a shared preference
("disproportionate attraction" to non-construction work). That preference,
however, is not just an aggregation of individual choices, but an expression of
collective agency. In its zeal to defend the singular conception of the individual
and that individual's "personal rights," the Croson opinion mobilizes the very
discourse of racial group identity ("blacks") and racial group decisionmaking
("black and white career and entrepreneurial choices") that a strict adherence to
methodological individualism would rule out of bounds. In short, Justice
O'Connor uses a race-conscious, collectivist claim to secure the case against
such claims.
I have not focused on these moments of performative contradiction in the
social vision of Bakke and Croson for their own sake. I have done so rather
because they seem to me to illustrate the limitations of the anti-discrimination
principle as a general grammar for thinking about constitutional equality. To my
mind, the anti-discrimination principle provides too crude a framework for
understanding what is at stake in affirmative action. More precisely, the abstract
individualism of the anti-discrimination model misapprehends the decidedly
social purpose, meaning and effects of the practices affirmative action policy is
designed to address. While the exercise of racial and gender power
unquestionably targets individuals, its ultimate object is the subordination of
entire social groups. Like the subordinating practices to which it fashions a
63 Croson, 488 U.S., at 493.
64 Crenshaw, supra note 14, at 284.
65

Croson, 488 U.S., at 503.
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programmatic response, affirmative action embraces a "group-grounded"
perspective toward the idea of equality. 67 To borrow and adapt the words of one
commentator, there at least two distinct respects in which the mediating principle
of anti-subordination provides an indispensable social perspective on the problem
of inequality. First, affirmative action "focuses on society's role in creating
subordination. ' 68 Second, it attends to the ways "this subordination affects, or
has affected groups of people." 69 Put another way, affirmative action starts from
the proposition that "[i]t
is more invidious for women or blacks to be treated
worse than white men than for men or whites to be treated worse than blacks or
women . ..because of the differing histories and contexts of subordination
faced by these groups." 70
I hope by now to have shown that the current contours of American
affirmative action jurisprudence reflect the continuing grip in which the dogma
of abstract individualism has held the social imagination of the U.S. Supreme
Court. In matters of race, an evident indifference to the concrete social
dimensions of inequality has rendered the Court unwilling or unable to take the
group-sensitive perspective seriously. Significantly, it was a Supreme Court
decision on gender-based affirmative action which suggested-at least for a
time-that the group-sensitive perspective on constitutional equality might force
its rivals to yield some ground. It is to that decision I next turn.
V.

THE GENDER OF AMERICAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW

The first and only case in which the Supreme Court has devoted exclusive
attention to the legality of affirmative action on behalf of women was its
decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California.71
The issue before the Court in Johnson was the legitimacy of gender preferences
67 Since I do not wish to be misunderstood, let me make it clear here that the "group-grounded"
model of equality I sketch and support here is not an argument for "group rights" as such. Strictly
speaking, what I am calling the "group-grounded" model of equality makes no claim about rights at
all. Rather, that model provides an analytic framework or an orienting structure for thinking about
equality which is distinguishable from the task of rights specification as such. Thus, while the vision
of affirmative action I describe here most decidedly endorses a "macro" or "societal" perspective
on the equality principle, it does not and need not reject the proposition that the rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment belongs to the individual. The argument differs from the abstract
individual model of equality in insisting that the rights of individuals under a regime of affirmative
action may (and inevitably must) be determined with reference to groups. On this point see Ronald
Fiscus, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action 57-61 (1992). If the goal of affirmative
action is to put race- and gender-based subordination "out of business," then its conception of
individual rights ought not be "abstracted" from the positional realities of group life. The conceptfigure of putting race and gender "out of business"appears in From Redistribution to Recognition?:
Dilemmas of Justice. in a 'Postsocialist' Age, in Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical
Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition 11, 20-22 (1997).
68 Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1003, 1009 (1986).
69Id.

70

Id.

Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). For a history of the Johnson case, see Melvin I. Urofsky,
Affirmative Action on Trial: Sex Discrimination in Johnson v. Santa Clara (1997).
7'
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under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. The challenged
plan had been voluntarily adopted by the Santa Clara County Transportation
Agency, a public employer. The plan aimed, in part, to increase the number of
women promoted to positions within traditionally sex-segregated jobs in which
women had historically been significantly under-represented. 72 The plaintiff, Paul
Johnson, claimed that he had been denied promotion to a road dispatcher
position with the county solely on the basis of his sex, in violation of Tite VII.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court's opinion, written by Justice
Brennan, held that the Transportation Agency had not violated the statute in
taking the sex of a competing female applicant for the position into account. On
Justice Brennan's reasoning, the consideration of gender in order to rectify a
'manifest imbalance' " that reflected the under representation of women in
'traditionally segregated job categories' ,,73 was not unlawful "sex
discrimination" within the meaning of Title VII.
Since no constitutional issue was raised or litigated in the trial court, the
Johnson Court confined itself to interpretation of the relevant statute. Although
Title VII analysis of affirmative action differs markedly from the affirmative
action analysis in the constitutional context, the two bodies of law both rely
substantially on a common conceptual vocabulary. The Court's interpretation of
the statute thus holds important implications for an understanding of the
constitutional dimensions of gender-based affirmative action. 74
In this connection, several aspects of the Court's opinion in Johnson merit
mention. First, and most notably, the Court's opinion says almost nothing on the
question of whether affirmative action plans directed at women should be
assessed any differently than race-based affirmative action policy. It should be
noted, too, that the Johnson Court did not deem it necessary to come to grips
with the proposition that affirmative action law is an inappropriate tool for
dealing with generalized "societal" discrimination. Although Justice Brennan
asserts that women are confronted with "strong social pressures" 75 not to pursue
employment prospects in certain types of jobs, he does not directly respond to a
central claim made by the dissenting members of the Court. This was the
contention that the affirmative action program sustained in Johnson was not
designed to remedy "identified discrimination" on the part of Santa Clara
County, but was instead an impermissible response to the limitations which
"societal attitudes" have imposed on women's entry into certain sectors of the
76
labor market.
72 The agency's affirmative action plan was not limited to sex. By its terms, the Santa Clara
County plan also targeted "minorities" and "handicapped persons." Johnson, 480 U.S at 620.
73 Id., at 631 (quoting Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
74 For a similar argument see Rosenfeld, supra note 21 at 197.
71 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634, n. 12 (Quoting Johnson v. Santa Clara, 748 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir.
1984)).
76 See, e.g., id., at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting)("The most significant proposition of law established
by today's decision is that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VII when it is
intended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's own discrimination, but of societal attitudes
that have limited the entry of certain races, or of a particular sex, into certain jobs.").
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In short, Johnson accorded legitimacy to affirmative action programs
undertaken solely to redress the disadvantages that "society-wide"
discrimination has historically imposed on women. Under Johnson, employers
were not obliged to show that their affirmative action policies were based on
their own past discrimination. Further, the decision appeared to accept the
adoption of "goals" (if not set "quotas") that would gradually remedy the
gender "imbalance" or "underpresentation" of women in jobs to which they
have historically had little or no access. The Johnson Court thus endorses the
notion that the equality norm embodied in Title VII does not completely
foreclose the affirmative pursuit of gender equity in the workplace. Taken
together, these twin aspects of the Johnson opinion gesture toward a groupsensitive model of gender equality.
However, at least one element of Johnson stands in arguable tension with the
account of the decision I have developed here. At one point in the opinion,
Justice Brennan categorically dismisses the notion that Paul Johnson was an
"innocent victim" of the County's affirmative action policy. On Justice
Brennan's account, Mr. Johnson could not claim an "absolute entitlement" to
the promotion whose denial had occasioned his complaint: "Denial of the
promotion," wrote Justice Brennan, "unsettled no legitimate, firmly rooted
expectation on the part of the petitioner."" At the same time, the Johnson
opinion expressly disavowed any suggestion that the Court was allowing Santa
Clara County to "unnecessarily [trammel] the rights of male employees or
[create] an absolute bar to their advancement. '78 One of the components of the
Santa Clara County plan that apparently predisposed the Court to uphold it was
the fact that it did not set aside employment opportunities for women, or prevent
men from competing for each announced position: "[T]he Agency Plan requires
women to compete with all other qualified applicants. No persons are
automatically excluded from consideration; all are able to have their
qualifications weighed against those of other applicants." ' 79 Another positive
feature of the affirmative action plan in Johnson, from the Court's perspective,
was the fact that though the plaintiff in that litigation gained nothing, he also
lost nothing. Brennan took pains to note that "while [Johnson] in this case was
denied a promotion, he retained his employment with the Agency, at the same
salary and with the same seniority, and remained eligible for other
promotions." 80
The Court's emphasis on these features of the Santa Clara County affirmative
action program suggests that one of the reasons the challenged plan passed
judicial muster lay in the fact that it did not totally abandon either the formal or
the abstract individual models of equality. Consider in this connection what the
Johnson Court did not say. The Court expressed no concern about the possibility
77Johnson, 480 U.S., at 638. For an extended discussion and critique of the "innocent persons
argument" against affirmative action see Fiscus, supra note 67, at 37-50.
78Johnson, 480 U.S., at 637-638.
79 Id., at 638 (emphasis supplied).
80Id., at 638.
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that the right of male employees to individual consideration might in the end
have little practical impact on the county's hiring and promotion process. It
seemed to be enough for the Johnson Court that the Santa Clara plan accorded
some minimal degree of formal recognition to the interests of individual male
workers. I do not mean to suggest that the Johnson opinion's view of the formal
and abstract individual models of equality is in no way indistinguishable from
the rest of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. Such a claim would be
overdrawn. I want rather to underscore the felt necessity in Johnson to stay
inside the normative boundaries of the anti-discrimination principle with which
these two models are associated.
This aspect of Johnson finds its most symptomatic expression in the Court's
incomplete and conflicting theories of affirmative action. In announcing the
Court's judgment, Justice Brennan uses two different terms to describe the
challenged affirmative action program. On the one hand, Justice Brennan
repeatedly characterizes the Santa Clara plan with reference to the concept, or,
more precisely, the metaphor of representation. The purpose of the policy, he
asserts, was to remedy a problem of "underrepresentation" in the county's
workforce. 8" In this model of affirmative action, the issue before the Johnson
Court is whether Title VII permits the "factor" of "sex" to be "[taken] into
account" in considering a (sexually) "representative" individual job candidate.
The legality of gender-based affirmative action essentially presents a question
about the validity of "sex-consciousness" with respect to the discrete, timebound act of employee selection. The "underrepresentation" paradigm of the
Johnson opinion accordingly focuses on the gender identity of the individual
worker or the legitimacy of gender differentiation.
The second concept-metaphor Justice Brennan uses to characterize the
challenged plan is that of "balance." The goal of Santa Clara policy, Brennan
argues, was to rectify an "imbalance" in the country's workforce.12 In this
second model of affirmative action, the precise terms in which the Court casts
the question before it do not change. The issue is still whether "sex" may be
considered in employment decisionmaking. One can nonetheless detect a subtle
but significant shift in the social vision that subtends the Court's answer to that
question. Consider in this connection the Johnson opinion's exhaustive recitation
of statistics about the gender demographics of the Santa Clara County work
11 See, e.g., id., at 622 (the goal of the plan was to increase the opportunities for women in job
categories in which they were "poorly represented"); id., at 634 (the plan was adopted "for the
purpose of remedying underrepresentation" by women in skilled craft jobs); id., at 636 (women were
"egregiously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category..."); id., at 648 (describing the plan
as a "moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the
representation of minorities and women in the Agency's work force").
82 See, e.g., id., at 626 (the Santa Clara plan was adopted "to address a conspicuous imbalance in
the Agency's work force . . ."); id., at 634 (the challenged plan "sought to remedy [the]
imbalances" in the job assignments of men and women"); id., at 637 ("given the obvious

imbalance" between male and female employees in the skilled craft sector of the county labor force
it was "plainly not unreasonable" to consider sex in the decision not to hire Johnson); id., at 639
(the county plan "was intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one).
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force. 83 The statistical narratives the Court offers aim to establish something
much more meaningful than mere "underrepresentation." Justice Brennan's
account of these background statistics stops just short of suggesting a more
disturbing record of sexual exclusion and segregation." Like the representational
paradigm, the analytic metaphor of "imbalance" is never theoretically
developed. Nevertheless, one might describe the different social visions that
inform the two concepts in the following terms. The "under-representation"
model focuses on agency-sensitive issues such as gender differentiation and the
gender identity of workers: its central normative interest is the legitimacy of
gender recognition. The "imbalance" approach accents structure-sensitive
questions such as gender marginalization and the gendered division of work: its
focal normative concern is the legitimacy of gender redistribution. The "underrepresentation" model thus emphasizes the means or "sex-conscious" techniques
that gender-based affirmative action uses. By contrast, the "imbalance" model
stresses the ends those means or techniques aim to achieve.
The Johnson Court treats the "representation" and "balance" paradigms as
though they were simply two expressions of a single idea. I have aimed to show
why the two models in fact carry different connotations, which gesture toward
two divergent theoretical understandings of the social meaning of affirmative
action. In my view, the Johnson Court's combined and uneven use of the
"underrepresentation" and "imbalance" approaches reflects a deeper
indecisiveness about the political vision of affirmative action. Does gender-based
affirmative action aim to achieve substantive equality between men and women?
Does the anti-discrimination principle help or hinder the realization of that
substantive goal? Is the goal of sex-based affirmative action the recognition of
women as a socio-cultural group, or is it instead the redistribution of politicaleconomic goals across the "gender-line"? Because it had lacked a structural
conception of gender inequality, 5 these were questions the Supreme Court could
6
not answer, or think to ask.1
83 See, e.g., id., at 621 (detailing the percentages of Santa Clara County's female transportation
employees who were "concentrated" in EEOC job categories traditionally held by women); id., at
634 (stating the precise numbers of women in various job classifications at the transportation
agency).
81 See, e.g., id., at 634 (Noting the agency's finding that women were not only concentrated in
traditionally female jobs, but "represented a lower percentage in other job classifications than would
be expected if such traditional segregation had not occurred")(emphasis supplied). In an earlier
passage, Justice Brennan recounts (by way of a footnote and without comment) a number of
instances in which the woman who received the disputed job promotion, Diane Joyce, was a target
of conduct that arguably amounted to unlawful discrimination. Id., at 624 n. 5.
85 Indeed, the Court does not even once mention the term "equality." The closest the Johnson
opinion comes to such a reference is in a quotation from the Santa Clara Transportation Agency's
affirmative action plan on the inability of the "mere prohibition of discriminatory practices" to attain
"an equitable representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons." Id., at 620.
86 As Nancy Fraser has noted, the pursuit of gender equality, rightly understood, entails demands
for both socio-cultural recognition and political-economic redistribution. See Fraser, supra note 67, at
19-20.
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In the years since the Johnson decision, "the roof seemed to fall in on
affirmative action in the high court." '8 7 The state of affairs in the U.S. thus
diverges markedly from Europe, where the development of positive action
jurisprudence is still in its foundational stages. Despite their different
genealogies, however, the points of contact between U.S. affirmative action law
and the European law of positive action reveal a striking doctrinal resemblance.
Nonetheless, the very different political dynamics of European constitutional law
may soon push ECJ positive action discourse into terrain that U.S. equality
jurisprudence has thus far feared to tread.
VI.

GENDER-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN GERMAN (AND
EUROPEAN)LAW

Before discussing the ECJ's positive action decisions, I should situate that
Court's jurisprudence within its relevant legal context. From an American legal
perspective, three preliminary observations may be briefly made here. The first
point, with which I began my discussion, involves the scope of positive action.
In Germany, as in Europe generally, positive action policy is confined to
women.88 The second precursory point has to do with the sources of German
gender equality law. 89 In national constitutional terms, the gender equality norm
was first articulated in the 1949 Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal
Republic of Germany. The Basic Law of 1949 contained two provisions
regarding sex equality. The first of these was Article 3(3), which prohibits
discrimination on various grounds, including sex. 90 Article 3(2) of the Basic Law
declared that "[m]en and women shall have equal rights." 9' Although it
precedes Article 3(3), this provision was in fact adopted after Article 3(3), in
response to a campaign which mobilized thousands of German women to
demand gender-specific protection under the Basic Law.92 The post-reunification
revision of the Basic Law included a rewriting of Art. 3(2). In addition to its
recognition of the equal rights of men and women, the provision now charges
the state to "[promote] the actual enforcement of equality rights for women and
men and [work] to remove existing disadvantages." 93
For purposes of this discussion, however, the most important legal source of
German gender equality norms is the transnational law of the European Union.
This brings me to a third and final preliminary point. Although the positive
action programs at issue in the ECJ decisions I discuss involved statutes adopted
17 Urofsky, supra note 71, at 172. It thus bears noting that Johnson would most probably fail to
capture a majority of votes from the current members of the Supreme Court.
11See explanation supra note 1.
89A comprehensive survey of the relevant law is Ninon Colneric, Making Equality Law More
Effective: Lessons from the German Experience, 3 Cardozo Women's L.J. 229 (1996).
90 "No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language,
his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions." Art. 3(3) GG.
91Art. 3(2) GG.
92 Colneric, supra note 89, at 230. For a history of this episode see Robert G. Moeller, Protecting
Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany 38-75 (1993).
93Art. 3(2) GG,as amended.
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at the state or Lander level of the German federal system, the permissibility of
these programs was ultimately a question of European Union law.94 That is, the
controlling constitutional norms for assessing policies such as Germany's
positive action law are those contained in the "constitution" of the European
Union. To be sure, no single written document "proclaims itself [to be] the
'Constitution' of the EC or EU." 9 Nonetheless, it is now generally agreed that
the Treaty on European Union96 and interpretations of that Treaty in the Court of
Justice of the European Communities 97 represent a constitutional charter for the
original European Communities, and of the European Union they have become. 9
Two recent examples of the interplay between European law and German
positive action policy are the ECJ's decisions in Kalanke v. Freie- und
Hansestadt Bremen99 and Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Wesfalen.00
The first ruling by the ECJ regarding the validity of gender-based positive
action under EU law came in the 1995 Kalanke decision. The positive action
policy in question had been adopted by the Freie Hansestadt Bremen,
Germany. 0 1 Under the Bremen Land Law on Equal Treatment
(Landesgleichstellungsgesetz), women candidates received priority over men in
competition for jobs in which they had traditionally been underrepresented. The
complainant, Eckhard Kalanke, had been denied promotion to a management
94 Article 177(2) of the EEC Treaty establishes a referral mechanism whereby courts and tribunals
of member-states of the European Union may seek "preliminary decisions" in cases involving EC
law. Strictly speaking, a "preliminary decision" by the ECJ is not a disposition of the case referred
to it. Rather, a "preliminary decision" is only an authoritative judicial interpretation of the relevant
European law, whose application in the particular case is left to the national court or tribunal from
which the referral came. For a concise explanation of the "preliminary decision" mechanism, see
Leonard Jason-Lloyd and Sukhwinder Bajwa, The Legal Framework of the European Union 33-34
(1997).
95James D. Dinnage and John F. Murphy, The Constitutional Law of the European Union 83
(1996).
9 See Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27, 29
(1998) (arguing that "[t]he view that the Treaty forms the constitution of the EU may now be almost
axiomatic in Community law circles"). See also, Roland Bieber and Pierre Widmer, eds., The
European Constitutional Area (1995); G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for
Europe, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 595 (1989); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a
Transnational Constitution, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1981).
97 See Sauter, supra note 96, at 31.
98For a useful if skeptical intellectual history of the "constitutionalization"of European law and
the emergence of European constitutionalism see J.H.H. Weiler and Joel P. Trachtman, European
Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 J. Intl. L. Bus. 354 (1996); For a discussion of the
"Europeanization effect" on the jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court, see Klaus H.
Goetz, The Federal Constitutonal Court, in 2 Developments in German Politics 96 (Gordon Smith et
al. eds., 1996).
99 Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051.
100Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-409/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363.
10 The Bremen statute provided, inter alia, that "[iun the case of an assignment of an activity in a
higher pay, remuneration and salary bracket, women who make qualifications equal to those of their
male co-applicants shall be given priority [in those sectors where] they are under-represented."
Landesgleichstellungsgesetz [LGIG], Bremisches Gesetzblatt [Brem. Gbl.], S.433. (Law on equal
treatment of men and women in the public service of the Land of Bremen). Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. I3051, at para. 3.
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post in the Bremen Parks Department in favor of a female colleague. After
losing an administrative challenge, Kalanke brought suit in the Bremen city and
state labor courts. Kalanke contended that he had been unlawfully discriminated
against on the basis of sex, in violation of provisions contained in the German
Civil Code, the Bremen state constitution, and Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of the
German Basic Law.
The case reached the ECJ by way of the German Federal Labor Court
(Bundesarbeitsgericht), to which Kalanke had appealed after his case was
dismissed by both lower German courts. The Federal Labor Court sought a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ on whether the Bremen state positive action
policy was covered by Sections 2(1) and 2(4) of the European Council's 1976
Equal Treatment Directive, 0 2 which is part of the EU's social policy program. 03
Article 2(1) states that " . . . the principle of equal treatment shall mean that
there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or
indirectly"104 However, Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive authorizes
member-states to adopt and enforce ". . . measures to promote equal opportunity
for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect
women's opportunities."'' 0 5 The precise question in Kalanke was whether the
Bremen positive action program contravened the Article 2(1) prohibition on
"discrimination .. .on grounds of sex," or was instead a permissible effort
under Article 2(4) to "[remove] existing inequalities which affect women's
opportunities."
102Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L39) 40 (on the implementation of the principle of
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and
promotion, and working conditions).
103 For more detailed histories and analyses of Article 119 (the new Article 141) of the EC Treaty,
on which the Equal Treatment Directive and other elements of EU social policy are based, see
Evelyn Ellis, EC Sex Equality Law (1998); Women and the European Labour Markets (Anneke van
Doome-Huiskes et al. eds., 1995). The version of Article 119 that was in force at the time of the
Kalanke and Marschall decisions read: "Each Member State shall ensure . . . and subsequently
maintain the applications of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal
work." The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty amended Article 119 to read: "Each Member State shall ensure
that the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value is applied." By its terms,
Article 119 embodies only a norm of equal pay. However, the ECJ has long construed the Article to
impose a more general principle of equal treatment. This more liberal construction has also been
reflected in the social policy directives of the European Council. With the 1997 revision of the TEU,
this broader understanding of the equality concept is now expressly recognized as a fundamental
principle of EU constitutional law. In addition to the mentioned amendment, the Amsterdam Treaty
added a new provision to Article 119. This provision imposes an obligation on the European Council
to "adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of
equal pay for equal work or work of equal value." The new Article 141 thus now includes aspects
of equal treatment other than equal pay. They also make it clear that the Council's authority to enact
secondary legislation is not limited to prohibitions on sex discrimination, but extends as well to
measures that seek to insure equality of opportunity, such as those permitted under Article 2(4) of
the Equal Treatment Directive.
I- Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, at para. 15.
105Id., at para. 17.
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In his Opinion to the Court, Advocate General Tesauro argued that the
Bremen policy fell outside the scope of the measures contemplated by Article
2(4).10 6 For Tesauro, the fatal flaw in the Bremen plan was that it accorded
"absolute and unconditional priority" to women applicants for jobs in those
sectors of the public labor force in which they were underrepresented. The
Advocate-General contended that this aspect of the challenged gender preference
was a derogation from Mr. Kalanke's "individual right" not to be discriminated
against on the basis of his sex."07 Accordingly, the state of Bremen's positive
action program could not be reconciled with the principles of sex equality to
which Germany and other EU member states were bound by the provisions of
the Equal Treatment Directive.
In defending this interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive, Tesauro
08
began by offering "a few observations on the idea of positive action."1
Positive, or affirmative, action stems from the requirement to eliminate the existing
obstacles affecting particular categories or groups of persons who are disadvantaged
at work as a result. Positive action is,in particular, a means of achieving equal
opportunities for minority or, in any event, disadvantaged groups, which generally
takes place through the granting of preferential treatment to the groups in question.
In taking the group as such into consideration, positive action marks a transition
from the individual vision to the collective vision of equality.'0 9
The Advocate General's Opinion draws a distinction among three "models" of
positive action. The first model, on his account, does not aim to remove
"discrimination in the legal sense," but strives rather to address the "condition
of disadvantage which characterises women's presence on the employment
market."' 10 This is the most modest form of positive action, and entails such
measures as gender-specific outreach, vocational guidance and training. The
second strives to accommodate women who must balance professional and
family responsibilities, and to promote a better division of those responsibilities
between the sexes. This second form of positive action is reflected in policies
regarding flexible working hours, child-care, women who have returned to the
workplace after a long absence, or tax and social security policies that take
family responsibilities of workers into account.
Tesauro argues that the purpose of these two forms of positive action is to
achieve equal opportunities, and "in the final analysis""' to attain "substantive
'06 Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, Case C-450/93,
1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, at para. 29. From an American perspective, one of the more intriguing features
of ECJ decisionmaking is the prominent role accorded to its panel of Advocates General. Although
Opinions by Advocates General are not binding on the Court, they are deemed to be extremely
persuasive. The Advocate General's Opinion is frequently the basis for the Court's own
interpretations of EU law, and thus helps illuminate the reasoning behind the ECJ's characteristically
terse opinions. See Janet Dine et al., Procedure and the European Court 4 (1991).
6
107Opini n of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 106, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, at para. 23.
108Id., at para. 8.

109Id. (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
1o Id., at para. 9.
I Id.
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equality."' 12 However, he notes that neither of these versions of positive action
expects or pursues an immediate "quantitative increase in female
employment."" ' 3 They thus differ radically from the third positive action model,
' 4
whose central feature is the adoption of "systems of quotas and goals.""
Tesauro is openly critical of this model of positive action, which in his view has
come "to be regarded as a panacea for eliminating existing inequalities in the
reality of social life."" 5
The measure consisting of the imposition of quotas has come up for much
discussion, in particular from the point of view of its constitutionality: whilst it is
true that it is an instrument which is certainly suitable for bringing about a
quantitative increase in female employment, it is also true that it is the one which
most affects the principle of equality as between individuals,
a principle which is
116
safeguarded in most of the member states legal systems.
Although he notes that the Bremen state positive action program adopted a
system of so-called "soft" as opposed to "strict" quotas, Tesauro nonetheless
finds it "only too obvious" that "in this case there is discrimination on grounds
117
of sex."
The Advocate General's Opinion makes several comparative references to
U.S. affirmative action discourse, all by way of footnoted commentary. Taken
together, they offer a revealing glimpse of the social vision that stands behind
his approach to the legal issues raised in Kalanke. In one of these references,
Tesauro writes that the "collective vision of equality" endorsed by positive
action draws on a "concept of the group" which "does not find unequivocal
favor."" ' 8 The Advocate General describes a "tendency" (he declines to say
among whom) "to assert that preferential treatment in favor of certain groups
will end up increasing the feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis the majority," which
"[triggers] a definitive marginalization of those in whose favor it is done within
rigid social cages." 1 9 Tesauro goes on to note (again without specific
112 Id.

113 Id.
"'

Id.

"I Id. The Advocate General's typology of affirmative action has not gone unchallenged. As

Evelyn Ellis as pointed out, "it is by no means clear that this type of positive action is to be
differentiated from all other types in its attempt to remedy historical discrimination; this is surely
also the motive for some actions falling into the first two categories, for example, the provision of
training for jobs for which women were formerly not trained." Ellis, supra note 103, at 250.
116

Id.

Id., at para. 10. For a trenchant critique of Tesauro's descriptive and normative accounts of the
forms of positive action, see Ellis, supra note 103, at 250-53.
"I Id., at para. 8, n. 9. Although he does not specifically say so, the sense of the passage in
question suggests that Tesauro is describing his understanding of U.S. affirmative action discourse.
As a grammatical matter, his account of the critiques of affirmative action policy are all pitched in a
curiously passive voice, as in the remark that the "system of quotas and goals" (note the failure to
distinguish the two) "has come to be regarded as a panacea for eliminating existing inequalities in
the reality of social life." Id., at para. 9 (emphasis supplied). However, the overall tone of the
Advocate General's Opinion leaves little doubt that the characterized criticisms of U.S. affirmative
action policy are not far from his own.
"9 Id., at para. 8, n. 9.
117
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attribution) that "another accusation leveled against preferential treatment in
favor of disadvantaged groups" has to do with its adverse efficiency effects on
the "social commitment" of the "best" workers. 20 The Advocate General
concludes by observing "[imn Europe, positive action has begun to take hold or,
at any event, to become the object of attention at the very time when affirmative
action seems to be [in] a state of crisis in its country of origin."12'
Advocate General Tesauro's remarks do not pretend to speak to the precise
legal question the Court was asked to address in Kalanke. That, however, does
not seem to be their objective. The thrust of Tesauro's comparative observations
on the "state of crisis" which has seized U.S. affirmative action discourse is
rather more ideological. Put bluntly, it would seem that the goal here is to raise
the specter of multiculturalism, which has received a decidedly hostile reception
in European circles. 12 2 Tesauro's pointed evocation of the "dialectical battles"' 123
that are raging within U.S. sexual (and racial) politics seems odd when one
considers the energy he expends downplaying the significance of the program
challenged in Kalanke. As we have seen, Tesauro's general account of the nature
of positive action is interwoven with a series of claims regarding the different
conceptions of equality that ground the "group rights" model of positive action
and the "individual rights" paradigm which (on his view) informs the Equal
Treatment Directive. At the beginning of his Opinion, Tesauro explains that the
individual rights model draws on the concept of "formal" equality, which
strives for "equal treatment as between individuals as belonging to different
groups."' 1 24 By contrast, the group rights paradigm endorses a concept of
"substantive" equality, which seeks "equal treatment between groups."' 125
However, as Tesauro expounds on these drawn distinctions, each term
undergoes a destabilizing semantic shift. The Advocate General concedes that
Article 2(4) permits EU member states "to implement positive actions," but
insists that such policies are authorized "only to the extent to which those
actions are designed to promote and achieve equal opportunities for men and
women, in particular by removing the existing inequalities which affect women's
opportunities in the field of employment." 126
Three parallel rhetorical moves should be noted here. One crucial manoeuver
in this part of the argument focuses on the idea of "equal opportunities." In an
120 Id., at para. 8, n. 9. It is not clear here whether "the best" to whom Tesauro is referring are
individuals who belong to the group targeted by positive action policy, or those who are members of
the group(s) to whom "preferential treatment" is denied.
121Id., at para. 8, n. 9. In the course of his remarks on the American experience, Advocate
General Tesauro cites a number U.S. Supreme Court affirmative action decisions. Interestingly,
Johnson is not one of them them, even though it has the most obvious relevance to the questions
raised in Kalanke.
122See, for example, Kendall Thomas, Wamung vor der Sackgasse, Der Tagesspiegel November 6,
1998, S.1; William A. Barbieri, Jr., Ethics of Citizenship: Immigration and Group Rights in Germany
50-56 (1998).
123Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 106, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, at para. 28.
124 Id., at para. 7.
125 Id.
126 Id.,

at para. 13.
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earlier section of his opinion, Tesauro explicitly links the "equality as
opportunity" paradigm to positive action. 2 7 However, as the discussion
proceeds, the Advocate General proceeds to deny the posited connection
between the two concepts. "Equal opportunities," he writes, "can only mean
putting people in a position to attain equal results ....
128 Having so stipulated,
Tesauro then makes the following astonishing assertion. This is the second
decisive move. "The very fact that two candidates of different sex have
equivalent qualifications implies the fact by definition that the two candidates
have had and continue to have equal opportunities: they are therefore on an
equal footing at the starting block."' 29 To grant women the preferential treatment
they receive in a "tie-breaker" situation (of which Kalanke is an example) is
thus a violation of the norm of equal opportunity (since equally qualified male
and female competitors are already at the same "starting block"). The Advocate
General acknowledges that "equality as regards starting points alone will not in
itself guarantee equal results."' 30 He also concedes that "tie-breaker" or
"decisional" quotas attempt to correct for the distorting effects on employer
decisionmaking of a "social structure which penalizes women" notwithstanding
their "merits" or "individual efforts."'' Tesauro nonetheless maintains that
"tie-breaker" quotas do not come within the scope of the Equal Treatment
Directive. Why? Because-this is the third and decisive move-such quotas
ultimately have nothing to do real, "substantive equality" of opportunity at all.
Rather, "tie-breaker" positive action programs seek to achieve "formal,
numerical equality" of result. This "formal" conception of equality, the
Advocate General tells us, "may solve [sic] some consciences" but it is in fact
"illusory and devoid of all substance."' 32
By the end of his Opinion, Advocate General Tesauro's analysis has become
hopelessly entangled in its own conceptual scheme. The meanings of "formal
equality" and "substantive equality" have been reversed: "real equality" has
been detached from the concept of group rights, and aligned instead with the
more "fundamental principle" of individual rights. 33 The concept of "positive
action" has ceased to be "a means of equal opportunity" and become a mere
demand for "an equal share of jobs."' 34 Indeed, because they fail to address
"the economic, social and cultural model which is at the root of the
inequalities" between women and men, the Advocate General finally concludes
that the "tie-breaker" measures challenged in Kalanke are not very
"significant" at all. 135 From this perspective, then, the most objectionable
"

127

Id., at para. 8.

128

Id., at para. 13 (emphasis supplied).

129

Id., at para. 13.

130 Id., at para. 14.
131

Id., at
at
Id., at
Id., at

132Id.,
133
13

para.
para.
Para.
para.

14.
28.
27.
26.

135 Id., at para. 28.

19991

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECOGNITION

dimension of the Bremen state positive action program is not the boldness, but
the modesty of its underlying social vision.
Given the brevity of its judgment in Kalanke, we can only speculate about the
extent to which the Court of Justice shared the expressed views of Advocate
General Tesauro. One point of agreement, however, was clear: like the Advocate
General, the ECJ thought the Bremen positive action program was incompatible
with EU law. The Court began its judgment with two observations about Article
2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, both of which it had made in previous
cases. The first point was that Article 2(4) specifically permitted national
measures which, "although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to
eliminate or reduce actual instances which may exist in the reality of social
life."' 13 6 Put another way, Article 2(4) did not forbid member-states from
adopting employment-related policies, "including promotion, which give a
specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete
13 7
on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men."'
The second point was that Article 2(4) nonetheless had to be interpreted strictly,
since it constituted "a derogation from [the] individual right" to equal treatment
guaranteed under Article 2(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive. 3 ' Using this
principle of strict interpretation, the Court of Justice concluded that a national
rule which accorded women "absolute and unconditional priority" for job
appointment or advancement "go[es] beyond promoting equal opportunities and
overstep[s] the limits" of Article 2(4). The Kalanke Court went on to reject
categorically the proposition that positive action was a device for achieving
"equal representation of men and women" in a particular workplace. On the
Court's account, this "equal representation" model of equality distorted the
meaning of Article 2(4). To the extent the Bremen "rule of priority" sought to
directly "substitute" equality of representation for equality of opportunity, it
impermissibly confounded the means for achieving gender equality with its
ultimate end. 139 In short, while equal representation might well be the eventual
result of positive action, it could not be used as an intentional tool to get there.
The one respect in which the Court's judgment differed from that of the
Advocate General was in the apparent emphasis it laid on the "absolute and
unconditional" character of Bremen's positive action law. This was an element
of the Bremen policy that the Advocate General had neither mentioned nor
discussed in his Opinion. The Kalanke Court failed to indicate precisely whether
or why the "absolute and unconditional" aspect of the Bremen law was
decisive. 140 As a result, the language of the judgment left open the possibility
136

Id., at para. 18.

137

Id., at para. 19.

138

Id., at para. 20.

Id., at para. 23.
Indeed, it was not at all clear that this was a correct characterization of the Bremen state
statute, or, more precisely, of the interpretation the statute had been given in the German national
courts. As the ECJ itself notes, in order to render the Bremen law consistent with the sex equality
provisions of the German Basic Law, the Federal Labor Court had interpreted the "rule of priority"
to permit "exceptions ... in appropriate cases." Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, at para. 9. It thus
131

140
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that a more qualified and conditional "rule of priority" might well survive a
challenge under the equal treatment principle of Article 2(1).
In Germany, the Court's judgment in Kalanke met with a chorus of
disapproval, 41 whose echoes could still be heard when the Court of Justice was
asked for a preliminary ruling on yet another German positive action policy in
Marschall.

Marschall reached the ECJ on a referral from the Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgericht) of Gelsenkirchen, Germany. The case involved a challenge
by a teacher named Hellmut Marschall. Mr. Marschall had applied for a teaching
position in a public secondary school. The government authority that considered
his candidacy informed Mr. Marschall that it intended to appoint a competing
female candidate to the post. The decision not to offer the promotion to Mr.
Marschall was based on a "rule of priority" contained in the Law of Civil
Servants of the Land (Beamtengesetz ffir das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen). Under

the challenged policy:
Where, in the sector of the authority responsible for promotion, there are fewer
women than men in the particular higher grade post in the career bracket, women
are to be given priority for promotion in the event of equal suitability, competence
and professional performance, unless 142
reasons specific to an individual [male]
candidate tilt the balance in his favour.

The question before the Court of Justice was whether a "rule of priority" that
contained an explicit "exceptions clause" was permitted under the terms of
Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive.
Counsel for the Nordrhein-Westfalen state authorities maintained that the sexspecific "rule of priority" had been adopted to address an entrenched inequality
in the public employment sector between women and men.1 43 This inequality
was said to flow from the fact that employers had historically tended to prefer
44
male candidates over equally qualified female candidates for the same post.
The Land maintained that this gender-preference for male candidates could be
traced to the use of "traditional" promotion criteria such as age, seniority, and
the fact that a male candidate was the head or sole breadwinner of his
household. Nordrhein-Westfalen argued that as a practical matter, the effect of
these traditional promotion criteria had been to place women in the Land in a
position of "disadvantage" across a broad spectrum of the public labor
market.145 Counsel for the Land further noted that the permitted exception to its
seems odd that the Court of Justice nonetheless insists on labelling the Kalanke quota "absolute and
unconditional." In the Marschall case, Advocate General Jacobs was to make much of this
contradiction, although without success. See discussion infra at 31-32.
141 See Ann Donahue, The Kalanke Ruling: Gender Equality in the European Labor Market, 18 J.
Intl. L. Bus. 730, 746 (1998); Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadi Bremen: The
Significance of the Kalanke Decision on Future Positive Action Programs in the European Union, 30
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1087, 1124 (1997).
142 Marschall, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363, at para. 3.
143 Id., at para. 4.
I4 Id.
145 Id.
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positive action law allowed "sufficient flexibility" for departures from the "rule
of priority" in order "to take into account any reasons which may be specific to
individual [male] candidates." 146 Finally, Nordrhein-Westfalen contended that
because the challenged statute did "not guarantee absolute and unconditional
priority for women" it came safely "within the limits outlined by the court in
Kalanke. " 147
Concerned no doubt about the consequences the Court's decision might entail
for their own positive action policies, the Commission as well as the Spanish,
Austrian, Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian governments intervened in Marschall
to support the position advanced by Nordrhein-Westfalen. The Finnish, Swedish
and Norwegian governments maintained that "the national rule in question
promotes access by women to posts of responsibility and thus helps to restore
balance to labour markets, which, in their present state, are still broadly
partitioned on the basis of gender." 14 In addition to this argument, the Finnish
government observed that past experience in that country had shown that
"action limited to providing occupational training and guidance for women or to
influencing the sharing of occupational and family responsibilities is not
149
sufficient to put an end to this partitioning of labor markets."
In his Opinion on the issues raised in Marschall, Advocate General Jacobs
urged the ECJ to follow the reasoning of its decision in Kalanke. Jacobs saw no
meaningful difference between the Nordrhein-Westfalen program and the Bremen
state law. The Advocate General did not dispute the claim that EU members
could adopt policies to deal with the problem of "structural discrimination"
against female workers. 150 He nonetheless insisted that under Article 2(4) of the
Equal Treatment Directive, member states were authorized only to take measures
that would promote "equal opportunity for men and women". Jacobs started
from the "axiomatic" principle that "there is no equal opportunity for men and
women in an individual case if, where all else is equal, one is appointed or
promoted in preference to the other solely by virtue of his or her sex."'' The
Advocate General took the view that, like the policy in Kalanke, the NordrheinWestfalen statute went "beyond the promotion of equal opportunities by seeking
to impose instead the desired result of equal representation.' l 2 The Advocate
General contended that this "imposition"of the "equal representation" model of
equality rendered the Nordrhein-Westfalen positive action program "contrary to
the principle of equal treatment as enshrined in [Article 2(1)]." 11
146
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Id., at para. 5.
Id., at para. 17.
Id., at para. 16. The governments of France and the U.K intervened to argue against the

Nordrhein-Westfalen policy. In their view, the "rule of priority" was indistinguishable from the
scheme the Court had found impermissible in Kalanke. Id., at para. 18.
149 Id., at para. 16.
150 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-409/95,
1997 E.C.R. 1-6363, at para. 7. This was the first time the term "structural discrimination" had been
used in the Court to describe the problem positive action was designed to address.
151 Id., at para. 32.
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Advocate General Jacobs argued further that the asserted distinction between
the Bremen statute challenged in Kalanke and the Nordrhein-Westfalen law was
more apparent than real. Jacobs contended that the national rule the Court had
invalidated in Kalanke "was not in fact absolute and unconditional." 154 The
Advocate General pointed to language in the ECJ's own judgment in Kalanke
noting the German Administrative Court's finding "that the rule had to be
interpreted 'with the effect that, even if priority for promotion is to be given in
principle to women, exceptions must be made in appropriate cases.' "I"5 Jacobs
then conceded for argument's sake that an "exceptions clause" might in some
circumstances make a given positive action program compatible with the equal
treatment principle. Having granted that concession, however, he still denied that
the Nordrhein-Westfalen 5 6 exception would bring the statute within the safe
harbor of the Directive. In its arguments to the Court, Nordrhein-Westfalen made
much of the fact that its state legislature had deliberately crafted the challenged
positive action law "in order to ensure sufficient flexibility and in particular to
leave the administration scope for taking into account all sorts of reasons
specific" to individual male candidates. The Advocate General noted that the
contemplated grounds for departing from the "rule of priority" included
"traditional secondary criteria of length of service and 'social reasons' " such as
marital status, parental responsibilities, and the like. i" 7
The Land of North Rhine-Westphalia has indicated that the national rule at issue in
this case is intended to displace the application in selection procedures of 'traditional
secondary criteria' which it regards-no doubt correctly-as discriminatory. The
proviso however appears to envisage that precisely those criteria may none the less
be used where it is invoked, with the result that the post will be offered to the male
candidate on the basis of criteria which it is accepted are discriminatory. If an
absolute rule giving priority to women on the ground of their sex is unlawful, then a
conditional rule which either gives priority to women on the ground of their sex or
gives priority to men
on the basis of admittedly discriminatory criteria must a
58
fortiori be unlawful.
Seizing on the Land's admission that decisionmakers would in effect be allowed
to continue the very practices the law was designed to counteract, Jacobs
maintained that the permitted exception to the "rule of priority" was as much a
violation of the equal treatment principle as the rule itself.
The Advocate General's Opinion appeared to clinch the argument that
Kalanke had effectively settled the issue presented in Marschall. Surprisingly,
however, the ECJ took the view that unlike the Bremen statute, the NordrheinWestfalen positive action policy was compatible with the relevant provisions of
the Equal Treatment Directive. The basic terms of the Court's analysis were
essentially the same as the preliminary ruling in Kalanke. The chief distinction
151Id., at para. 28.
5
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Id.
Id., at para. 35.

Id., at para. 8.
158Id., at para. 36.
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between the two judgments lies in the broader social vision of work and gender
that underwrites the discussion of positive action in Marschall.
Most notable in this connection is the ECJ's greater willingness to attend to
the "lived experience" of women in the workplace.
As the Land and several governments have pointed out, it appears that even where
male and female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be
promoted in preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudices and
stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in working life and the
fear, for example, that women will interrupt their careers more frequently, that owing
to household and family duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or
that they will be absent
from work more frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth
159
and breastfeeding.

In Kalanke, the Court of Justice had also recognized the impact of "social
attitudes, behaviour, and structures" on women's access to work.' ° However, in
Marschall, these social facts are given greater accent and emphasis. The chief
evidence of their influence can be seen in the "realist" elements of the Court's
analysis. As in Kalanke, the Marschall Court notes that the Equal Treatment
Directive explicitly authorizes measures which, though "discriminatory in
appearance" are "in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of
inequality which may exist in the reality of social life."' 16 ' However, the
Marschall decision goes farther than Kalanke to acknowledge that these "actual
instances of inequality which may exist in the real world" may persist even in
conditions of formal equality. 162 The Marschall Court in effect "pierces the veil"
of formal equality it hid behind in Kalanke. Drawing on this "realist"
understanding of the actual dynamics of gender inequality, the Court pointedly
notes that "the mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are
equally qualified does not mean that they have the same chances."'' 63 It is this
"realist" reorientation toward the equality principle which explains the ECJ's
conclusion in Marschall that measures which "give a specific advantage to
women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labor market
and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men" are not necessarily
inconsistent with Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive.' 64 In
Kalanke, the Court had gone out of its way to dissociate itself from the notion
that the formal "equality of opportunity" guaranteed under the Directive might
justify the direct pursuit or imposition of substantive "equality of
representation."'' 65 In Marschall, the "equal representation" model of equality
completely drops out of the Court's discussion of the Equal Treatment Directive.
The Court neither affirms nor denies the relevance of the "equal representation"
159Marschall,
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norm: it simply ignores the concept altogether. 166 Given the centrality of the
argument against "equal representation" in Kalanke, the Marschall Court's utter
silence on this score is deafening. Put bluntly, it defies credibility to think that
the Court of Justice did not know how radically its Marschall analysis diverged
from the interpretation of the equality principle on which it had insisted in
Kalanke.
In highlighting the more critical stance the Court of Justice seems to take
toward the concept of formal equality, I do not mean to suggest that formalism
played no role at all in the reasoning of the Marschall decision. To the contrary.
One of the most fascinating aspects of the Marschall ruling from an American
perspective is its uneasy combination of "realist" and "formalist" interpretations
of the equality principle. On the one hand, the Court of Justice seems quite
willing to accept the proposition that member states may enact gender-based
positive action policies in spite of the Equal Treatment Directive's command that
"there shall be no discrimination whatsoever" on the basis of sex. In doing so,
the Marschall Court implicitly endorses the norm of substantive, factual equality
it had so emphatically rejected in Kalanke.
On the other hand, the Marschalljudgment reflects the Court's apparent need
to declare its continued allegiance to the formalist claims of abstract
individualism. The ECJ stressed that it would not countenance positive action
programs that (to borrow language from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in
Johnson) "automatically exclude [men] from consideration."' 161 In an effort to
find a meaningful distinction between the Nordrhein-Westfalen positive action
program and the Bremen state plan it had struck down in its Kalanke, the Court
of Justice made much of the fact that the Nordrhein-Westfalen did not guarantee
women a preference over equally qualified male candidates. On the Court's
account, the Marschall statute guaranteed all job candidates a formal and
"objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the
individual."' 6 Moreover, noted the Court, the Nordrhein-Westfalen program
expressly permitted departures from the "rule of priority" where "reasons
specific to an individual [male] candidate tilt[ed] the balance in his favor."1 69 It
166
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and repeated references in his opinion to the importance the ECJ had attached to the distinction
between "equal opportunity" and "equality of representation" in Kalanke. See, e.g., Marschall,
1997 E.C.R. I- 6363, at para. 21 (describing the Kalanke Court's express disapproval of the idea that
Article 2(4) permitted the substitution of equal representation for equal opportunity); id., at para.25
(discussing the French and U.K. argument that the Nordrhein-Westfalen plan "seeks to impose
equality rather than to promote equality" in violation of Kalanke); id., at para. 29 (directly quoting
the passage from Kalanke in which the Court explained the difference between the two conceptions
of equality); id., at para. 32 (stating his own conclusion that "the effect of the ruling in Kalanke is
that any rule which goes beyond the promotion of equal opportunities by seeking to impose instead
the desired result of equal representation is similarly outside and scope of Article 2(4) and hence
contrary to the principle of equal treatment in Article 2(1) and in the present state of Community
law, unlawful").
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thus differed from the Kalanke plan, which, the Court argued, totally disregarded
the rights of individuals. Relying on this legal fiction, the Court side-stepped the
Advocate General's contention that this posited distinction between the two
plans had no basis in fact. 170 Like the U.S. Supreme Court's similar
pronouncements in Johnson, the ECJ's stubborn insistence that the Marschall
plan protected the "individual rights" of male candidates seems merely gestural.
Like its American counterpart, the European Court of Justice is finally unwilling
or unable openly to declare its independence from the formalist constraints of
the anti-discrimination principle. It is as though the ECJ could only start the
journey "from the individual to the collective vision of equality" 17' by denying
that it was moving at all.
VII.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN POSITIVE ACTION DISCOURSE

I have argued that the Marschall ruling marks the ECJ's first tentative steps
toward a more substantive conception of equality. In traveling the distance from
Kalanke to Marschall, the positive action discourse of the Court of Justice has
proven to be notably more expansive than that of the U.S. Supreme Court. And
yet, the European positive action decisions betray a decided ambivalence toward
the claims of substantive equality. As a result, the broader social vision that
underlies the ECJ's emergent critique of the anti-discrimination principle remains
inchoate and incomplete. The Court's social imagination is "realist" enough to
see that in the individual case, "merit" and "individual effort" do not guarantee
a woman a "fair chance" in the workplace. That social vision is not yet
"realist" enough to fully reckon with the deeper insight that the experience of
individual women takes place in a world where the very idea of work is (in the
172
words of one German female civil servant) "over-identified with men."'
Having glimpsed the degree to which the "actual inequality" at issue in
Marschall and Kalanke reflects the larger structural realities of the gendered
workplace, the Court of Justice anxiously lowers the formalist screen of the antidiscrimination principle.
Does the Marschall decision mark the outer limits of the ECJ's engagement
with the anti-subordination model and its group-grounded vision of equality? As
we have seen, EU positive action discourse has thus far confined its
consideration of substantive equality to issues of gender. However, recent
developments suggest that the future of the substantive equality principle in the
ECJ will likely be decided in a very different political context: the domain of
race and ethnicity. 73 Toward the end of last year, the newly elected German
170 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case C-409/
95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363, at para. 32.
171
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Quoted in Catherine Hoskyns, integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the European
Union 119 (1996).
17 The European Commission has taken the position that the EC Treaty provides no basis for
regulating racial discrimination by or within Member States. Dominic McColdrick, International
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government announced its intention to reform the country's citizenship policy.
Although the fate of the current proposals remains uncertain, some have already
argued that the extension of citizenship to Germany's racial and ethnic minorities
will require a concomitant extension of positive action beyond its present
174
gender-based boundaries.
Racial and ethnic politics in Germany have long been driven by
AuslIdnderfeindlichkeit, an almost visceral antipathy toward non-European
foreigners. 7 ' Given this state of affairs (which is by no means limited to
Germany), the explicit introduction of race and ethnicity into European positive
action policy may never find a political constituency in Germany. If it does,
however, the Court of Justice will be faced with a hard choice. Will the ECJ
forge a more robust conception of substantive equality than one finds in
Marschall, or will European positive action discourse retreat even further into
the formalist orthodoxies that have come to govern U.S. law? The answer to this
question will depend on the Court's willingness to imagine the significance of
positive action for a Europe that will soon be as transracial as it is transnational.
One can only hope that the Court of Justice will rise to the challenge, since the
prospects for multicultural citizenship in Europe may well determine the future
legitimacy of the European Union itself.

White Paper on European Social Policy-A Way Forward for the Union, COM (94) 333, final (July
1994), at para. 25). The EU's non-action on racial discrimination may be laid to the fact that a
number of Member States continue vigorously to oppose any effort by the EU to "Europeanize" the
field of race relations law. For a critical account of this "policy vacuum" and its implications for
EU women's policy (particularly with respect to women of color) see Hoskyns, supra note 172, at
176-191 (1996).
174 See, e.g., Barbieri, supra note 122, at 167.
171 Id., at 33.

